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Introduction
Hundreds of thousands of middle-class protesters took 
to the streets in Brazil on 15 March 2015 in an organised 
upsurge of protest against the federal administration led 
by President Dilma Rousseff of the Workers’ Party (Partido 
dos Trabalhadores, PT). Similar smaller demonstrations 
took place across the country on 12 April 2015. These 
demonstrations have erupted in the political vacuum cre-
ated by the increasing paralysis of Rousseff’s administra-
tion, which stems, in large part, from Brazil’s worsening 
economic conditions.
These difficulties have been compounded by aggres-
sive media reporting of the Lava Jato corruption scandal, 
which has badly damaged the government’s credibility. 
This scandal stems from the supposed channelling of vast 
sums of money from a network of firms to assorted indi-
viduals and political parties through the state-owned oil 
company Petrobras. 
This Development Viewpoint (DV) attempts to trace these 
political difficulties in Brazil to the economic policies im-
plemented by the PT administrations of both Luís Inácio 
Lula da Silva (2003-06 and 2007-10) and Dilma Rousseff 
(2011-14 and 2015-present). These administrations had 
delivered, for a time, significant gains in growth, employ-
ment and social equity, but they have been hampered by 
both recent global stagnation and the consequences of 
their own economic policy choices. 
In particular, this DV reviews the extent to which the 
PT administrations have had to maintain conservative 
macroeconomic policies. Such policies have come to be 
known as the ‘Policy Tripod’ and encompass a standard 
conventional package of 1) inflation targeting and central 
bank independence, 2) free capital movements and float-
ing exchange rates and 3) tight fiscal policies.
Lula’s First Administration
Lula, the founder of the PT, was elected President in 2002 
based on support from a coalition of various forces, most 
of which supported more expansionary and distributive 
economic policies. 
But these aspirations were limited not only by the im-
perative of managing an unwieldy political coalition, but 
also, immediately, by Lula’s ‘Letter to the Brazilian People’, 
issued just weeks before the election. In this communi-
cation he felt compelled to commit his government to 
the conventional economic policies of the Policy Tripod, 
largely in order to contain the outflow of hot money dur-
ing the election campaign and avoid an exchange rate 
crisis in case he was elected. 
Lula’s power was also limited by a Congress that was high-
ly fragmented across more than a dozen raucous and un-
reliable parties. The PT has never elected more than 15% 
of the Deputies and Senators for the Brazilian Congress, 
and the seats held by both the party and its close allies 
have never exceeded one-third of the total.
The first Lula administration introduced moderate redis-
tributive policies, including the formalisation of labour, 
rising minimum wages and new social transfer pro-
grammes. But broader social and economic gains were 
limited by the government’s determination to secure 
‘market credibility’ through the continued implementa-
tion of the Policy Tripod. 
The ensuing tight macroeconomic policies constrained 
transfers, public investment and industrial restructur-
ing and supported the overvaluation of Brazil’s currency. 
These economic weaknesses were disguised but not re-
solved by the global commodity boom that was gaining 
momentum in the background. 
This boom helped raise Brazil’s exports from around 
US$70 billion in 2003 to US$200 billion five years later. Tax 
revenues and aggregate demand rose in tandem, allow-
ing the government to raise social transfers by 172% in 
real terms between 1995 and 2010, and boost real mini-
mum wages by 72% between 2005 and 2012.
During these years there was also a modest expansion of 
infrastructure, the promotion of selected industries (espe-
cially those where competitive advantages could be eas-
ily achieved, such as large-scale agriculture, mining, oil, 
food processing and construction), and rapid increases in 
employment in low-wage and low-productivity services. 
However, modest GDP growth rates in the initial years of 
the first Lula administration constrained the implementa-
tion of more expansionary economic policies (see Table).
Lula’s government was also damaged politically in 2005 
by the Mensalão scandal, in which the government was 
accused, without clear evidence, of paying a monthly sti-
pend to Deputies and Senators in order to secure their 
support. Despite this political setback and uneven eco-
nomic progress, Lula was easily re-elected for a second 
term.
Brazil’s Economic Trends 2003-2013








Real GDP Growth (%) 3.5 4.6 2.1
Inflation Rate (%) 8.1 4.8 6.1
Current Account/GDP (%) 1.3 -1.3 -3.1*
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Lula’s Second Administration
During Lula’s second administration, the resources made 
available by the global commodity boom led to the adop-
tion of more expansive economic policies, including bold-
er industrial and fiscal policies, higher public-sector and 
SOE investment, and stronger redistributive programmes.
 
In the meantime, Lula was able to balance the demands of 
rival social groups by the judicious distribution of public 
resources through state investment, development funds, 
wages, social benefits and improved labour laws. The 
economy picked up speed, with real GDP growth rising 
from an average of 3.5% per year during his first admin-
istration to 4.6% under his second. Also, the inflation rate 
dropped from 8.1% to 4.8%. Tax revenue, investment, em-
ployment and incomes increased in a virtuous circle. 
The economic dynamics in Brazil were sufficiently strong 
to support bolder expansionary policies in the wake of 
the global crisis in 2008, leading to the country’s rapid 
recovery in 2009-10. By the end of his second administra-
tion in 2010, Lula’s approval rates reached 90%. 
Yet, these successes were limited by both faltering exter-
nal factors and the conservative policies still embraced by 
Lula’s administration. The government was also unable 
to diversify exports and raise the technological content 
of manufacturing production, leading to a decline in the 
manufacturing share of exports from 55% in the early 
2000s to less than 40% in 2014, and an ensuing average 
current account deficit of -1.3% of GDP during this second 
term. 
Brazil created 21 million jobs in the 2000s, in contrast to 
only 11 million in the 1990s, but the former were mostly 
precarious, poorly paid and unskilled, both on average 
and in comparison with those in the 1990s. In contrast, 
4.5 million ‘middle class’ jobs (paying over five times the 
minimum wage) disappeared during the 2000s. Urban 
services were relatively neglected and there was notable 
underinvestment in economic infrastructure.
Rousseff’s First Administration
Dilma Rousseff, who was Lula’s Chief of Staff, was elected 
as his successor in 2010. During her first administration 
(2011-2014), macroeconomic policies became, initially, 
nominally more progressive, but the Policy Tripod frame-
work still exerted significant influence. Interest rates did 
fall, fiscal policy became increasingly expansionary and 
new investment programmes were introduced. 
The government intervened in an increasing number 
of sectors to reduce costs and expand infrastructure, 
and BNDES (Brazil’s large development bank) financed 
a growing portfolio of loans. Some capital controls were 
introduced, and the government expanded its social pro-
grammes in order to dramatically reduce extreme pov-
erty. The strategic goal was to shift the engine of growth 
away from a faltering external sector and towards domes-
tic investment and consumption. 
But continuing global stagnation tightened up Brazil’s fis-
cal and balance of payments constraints, and quantitative 
easing in the USA contributed to destabilising the real and 
other developing country currencies. Continuing global 
uncertainty along with concerted domestic critiques of 
unnecessary economic ‘interventionism’ by the Rousseff 
administration limited private investment. 
Brazil’s prospects worsened further as China’s economy 
cooled and thus global commodity prices began to fall. 
During her first administration the current account bal-
ance as a ratio to GDP had an average deficit of 3.1%. The 
country’s public finances deteriorated, and annual infla-
tion rose above 6% on average (see Table). 
Government perceptions that its economic strategy was 
not working and that the external environment was un-
likely to improve led to policy zigzags. In the second half 
of the administration, Rousseff’s economic team increas-
ingly abandoned expansionary macroeconomic policies 
and reverted to the essentials of the Policy Tripod. Fiscal 
austerity returned, slowly at first, and a low inflation tar-
get became an increasingly important constraint on eco-
nomic policies. 
Soon Rousseff’s administration had to confront not only a 
worsening economy but also mounting political turmoil. 
The media ratcheted up its pressure on the administra-
tion and started scaremongering about an ‘economic di-
saster’. The government’s base of support weakened and 
it encountered increasing difficulties in passing new leg-
islation. 
Rousseff’s Second Administration
Dilma Rousseff was re-elected in 2014 by the narrowest 
margin in recent Brazilian history. In the first weeks of her 
second administration, she faced converging crises lead-
ing to the virtual collapse of the two axes of PT rule: its 
progressive economic model and the political alliances 
supporting its administration. The government’s earlier 
unwillingness to do away with the policies of the Policy 
Tripod, continuing global stagnation and the inadequa-
cies of the country’s industrial policies fed the overvalu-
ation of Brazil’s currency and led both to deindustrialisa-
tion and a wider current account deficit. 
These constraints effectively eliminated the scope for 
greater redistribution and rising economic growth. The 
growth of GDP already hovers around 0% during early 
2015. Insufficient investment in urban infrastructure in 
earlier years has led to a pronounced deterioration in ser-
vice provision, symbolised by a crisis in transport in 2013 
and dire water scarcity in 2014-15. 
Rousseff’s response to these crises has been to invite a 
representative of Brazil’s largest private bank to become 
the new Minister of Finance, and charge him with the im-
plementation of a more conventionally ‘credible’ adjust-
ment programme. The government’s weaknesses and its 
recent adoption, effectively, of the economic programme 
of its conservative opposition have triggered an escalat-
ing political crisis. 
In addition, another massive corruption scandal, based 
on the Lava Jato operation, has captured public attention.
Extensive media coverage has led to further deterioration 
in the government’s credibility and helped stoke a mass 
opposition movement demanding the ‘end of corruption’.
The Rousseff administration now appears to be stymied in 
implementing any further progressive economic policies. 
Economic growth, the improved distribution of income, 
employment gains and the expansion of infrastructure re-
main important goals in Brazil. But the current administra-
tion appears unable, in the current situation, to regain the 
political momentum that would enable it to work towards 
achieving them.
